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Coping with Boundary Issues in Urban Planning 
Projects 
 
Abstract 
 
Urban planning projects are planned and organized through arrangements between 
actors. These arrangements are institutional interventions: they intervene in the 
institutional landscape as existing organizational boundaries are (temporarily) 
redrawn. Such boundary decisions are intended to simplify complexity. However, 
these boundary decisions also produce new complexities as new boundary issues 
arise. Our contribution investigates these boundary issues by studying and comparing 
three urban planning projects in the Rotterdam urban system (the Netherlands). The 
analysis shows that the boundary issues are often underestimated and that coping 
strategies are required to deal with them. Because boundary issues pose serious 
threats to the success or even survival of projects, management should invest in 
increasing the capacity to deal with (often unexpected) boundary issues.  
Institutional Interventions in Complex Urban Systems: 
Coping with Boundary Issues in Urban Planning 
Projects 
 
Introduction 
 
The management and organization of urban planning projects is accompanied by 
institutional interventions to deal with the complexity of the projects. Institutional 
interventions are materialized organizational arrangements between the managing 
actors of the urban planning project. They are interventions in the existing 
institutional order as they impact on or redraw existing organizational boundaries. 
For instance, a public-private partnership (PPP) comes in between the existing public 
and private line organizations as an additional organizational structure is created 
(Verweij, 2012). From a system perspective, these institutional interventions imply 
certain boundary decisions and underlying boundary judgments (Van Meerkerk et 
al., 2013) about what is included and what is excluded in the arrangement, e.g. 
regarding the participation of certain actors. On the one hand, the institutional 
interventions reduce the complexity and uncertainty of urban planning projects by 
confining the number of elements and relations in a system and rearranging them in 
a comprehensible manner. For instance, tasks, responsibilities and activities are 
differentiated between a PPP and the line organizations. This enables action in 
complex urban systems. On the other hand, the interventions produce boundary 
issues that have to be coped with (cf. Fellows & Liu, 2012; Verweij, 2012). It is not 
uncommon that these issues are underestimated or unexpected, whilst they may pose 
serious threats to the project’s success or even to its survival (e.g. Fellows & Liu, 
2012; Van Meerkerk et al., 2013). 
This contribution aims to gain more insight in how institutional interventions 
deal with the complexity of urban planning projects. We are particularly interested in 
the boundary issues which could arise following the institutional interventions, and 
how actors cope with them. Our guiding research question is: what boundary 
decisions do institutional interventions imply, what are the underlying boundary 
judgments, which boundary issues arise, and how are these issues coped with? To 
answer this question, we analyze the boundary decisions that guided three 
institutional interventions in the Rotterdam urban system in the Netherlands. In the 
next section we provide a framework for studying the cases, followed by the research 
approach and methods in the section thereafter. The section “Institutional 
Interventions In The Rotterdam Urban System” contains the case analyses and in the 
sections “The Taming Of Complexity: Three Institutional Interventions Compared” 
and “Concluding Remarks” we draw conclusions and reflect on our findings. 
 
 
 
Institutional interventions and their boundary decisions in coping with 
complexity 
 
Urban planning projects are embedded in complex urban systems, in which different 
interdependent governmental agencies, commercial actors, non-for-profit 
organizations and residents reshape urban areas. Institutional interventions are 
based on boundary decisions about the content of the institutional arrangement, 
about who is part of the planning process and about how it is going to be realized. 
These boundary decisions enable action in complex urban systems: “boundaries serve 
to seal off the productive core, buffer it, level or smooth variability inputs and 
outputs, forecast variations and uncertainty, and impose rationing to protect the 
delineated territory from environmental penetration” (Yan & Louis, 1999: 31). 
Basically, boundary decisions determine which elements, relationships and 
operations (cf. Rescher, 1998) are included and which are excluded. Boundary 
judgments are the beliefs, rationalities and expectations underlying these decisions 
(cf. Pel, 2009). They are mental constructs of actors that refer to the assumptions 
about what should belong to the institutional intervention and what should belong to 
its environment (Ulrich, 1987). Boundary decisions are the specific manifestations of 
these boundary judgments. To structure our analysis of the boundary decisions of the 
institutional interventions, we distinguish between participation, territorial, 
functional and structural boundaries (Van Meerkerk et al., 2013). 
Participation boundary decisions concern the inclusion and exclusion of actors 
in/from the urban planning projects and the way in which these actors are involved 
(Ashmos et al., 2000; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006). Which actors are involved in the 
institutional intervention, and how does the institutional intervention deal with the 
involvement of other actors in the urban system? Territorial boundary decisions are 
demarcations concerning the geographical area that is the focus of the institutional 
intervention. Functional boundary decisions concern the substantive scope that is 
the focus of the institutional intervention (cf. Edelenbos et al., 2013), e.g. 
infrastructure, housing, nature, or some combination of these spatial functions. 
Structural boundary decisions concern demarcations about tasks and 
responsibilities (Ashmos et al., 2000), e.g. whether there is a strict and clear division 
of tasks and responsibilities between actors in the institutional intervention or 
whether institutional interventions are rather aimed at sharing responsibilities and 
tasks (cf. Teisman & Edelenbos, 2011; Verweij, 2012). Obviously, these four types of 
boundary decisions are interrelated, e.g. territorial and functional boundaries 
codetermine which actors are taken into account, but participation boundaries can 
also influence the scope of the project. 
The four different boundaries are defined by actors in the intervention. They are 
initially decided upon in e.g. plans, formal decisions, contracts or informal 
agreements. Boundary decisions are not necessarily shared among actors. They are 
based on judgments that only partly oversee the interdependencies and dynamics of a 
complex urban system. Therefore, these decisions will only to a certain extent 
succeed in internalizing and controlling complexity (Teisman et al., 2009). As a 
result, boundary issues will arise: the effects of existing or newly created 
interdependencies that cut across newly drawn boundaries and new 
interdependencies. These issues may initially not be acknowledged by the actors 
involved, but may influence the effectiveness and legitimacy of the boundaries drawn. 
For instance, actors excluded from the intervention by the participation boundary 
decision may hamper the smooth development of an urban planning project. 
Confronted with boundary issues, actors will deploy coping strategies so as to keep 
the project manageable (Van Gils et al., 2009). Coping strategies are improvised 
responses to the unintended and unexpected effects of earlier interventions that 
jeopardize their effectiveness or legitimacy (Steenhuisen, 2009; Koppenjan et al., 
2011). 
 
Approach and methods 
 
Our research is guided by the conceptual framework that is presented in the previous 
section. In the next section we will present the cases according to this framework. We 
start the case presentations with the moment the institutional intervention was 
formally anchored in e.g. a contract. Subsequently, we describe the four types of 
boundary decisions and the underlying boundary judgments. Then we focus on the 
main boundary issues that consequently arise, followed by an analysis of how the 
actors involved coped with them. We engage in pattern matching: we examine 
whether the three cases can be understood in terms of the concepts as suggested by 
our framework. Hence, we do not cross-compare the three cases; rather, we compare 
them with our framework. Yin (2009) refers to this as analytical generalization. We 
use the framework to select, order and interpret the empirical data, and to check if 
the framework allows doing so in a meaningful way. 
 
Case selection and data collection 
 
For purposes of comparison and researcher accessibility, all cases are institutional 
interventions in the Rotterdam urban system. Because we are interested in the 
generalizability of our framework (Yin, 2009), we selected dissimilar institutional 
interventions within the Rotterdam urban system. The first is a PPP project in the 
realization phase (A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein); the second is a PPP project in the 
planning phase (Heart of South); the third one is an intergovernmental arrangement 
to deal with strategic planning issues (Traffic Management Agency). A PPP is a 
partnership between a public principal and a private contractor in which both 
partners bring some kind or resources to the partnership and in which 
responsibilities and risks are shared, for the purpose of delivering public-
infrastructure based products (cf. Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). Within these cases the 
institutional interventions raised various boundary issues. To keep our comparison 
manageable, a selection of the boundary issues and coping strategies is presented in 
the present contribution. The criterion for the selection was that the boundary issues 
were exemplary for the boundary judgments underlying the institutional intervention 
cases. In the A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein project the misinterpretation of 
responsibilities between government and contractor are typical; in the Heart of South 
project the unanticipated need to compete with other projects for survival was the 
dominant issue; and in the case of the Traffic Management Agency the main issue 
concerned the difficulty to realize horizontal coordination between the actors. 
The main data source is secondary interview data which were collected by 
different authors for different research projects. In total, 36 interviews were 
conducted between 2010 and 2013 with (senior) project managers, project directors, 
politicians and stakeholders. Additional data include policy documents, websites and 
media coverage. The data were organized in case descriptions. 
 
Institutional interventions in the Rotterdam urban system 
 
As explained above, in this section we present the three separate case analyses 
according to our framework. Table 1 provides a summary. 
 
Table 1: summary of the case analyses 
 Expansion A15 
Corridor 
Redevelopment 
Heart of South 
Traffic 
Management 
Agency 
Moment 2010: closing of the 
PPP contract. 
2010: decision to 
commission the 
project organization 
to prepare a PPP. 
2008: 
establishment of 
the Traffic 
Management 
Agency. 
B
o
u
n
d
a
ry
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ec
is
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n
 
Territorial A15 corridor 
between the 
Maasvlakte port 
area and the 
Vaanplein highway 
junction. 
Planning area and 
neighborhoods in its 
environment. 
Rotterdam 
municipal territory 
including the port 
area. 
Functional Infrastructure 
development. 
Infrastructure 
development and 
social policy 
measures. 
Traffic 
management. 
Participatory Principal-
contractor 
arrangement; local 
stakeholders 
participate via 
implementation 
agreements. 
Principal-contractor 
arrangement; 
absence of 
stakeholder 
involvement.  
Formal 
cooperation 
between the public 
actors in the 
Agency. 
Structural Design, build, 
finance and 
Project organization 
aimed at realizing the 
Horizontal 
coordination 
maintenance of the 
infrastructure 
system are the 
responsibility of the 
contractor. 
project; the city 
council is placed at 
distance due to PPP 
arrangement. 
among various 
authorities with 
separate 
jurisdictions. 
Boundary issue Role conflicts 
between contractor 
and local 
stakeholders; the 
division of 
responsibilities 
between principal 
and contractor as 
arranged in the 
contract does not 
match the local 
stakeholders’ 
interpretation of 
the implementation 
agreements. 
During political 
decision making the 
boundaries of the 
project shift. The 
debate focusses on 
prioritizing 
municipal projects 
rather than judging 
the project on its own 
merits as was 
foreseen by the 
project organization. 
The consensus 
about the urgency 
of horizontal 
coordination does 
not match the 
actual judgments 
of actors of each 
other’s roles. One 
public actor fears 
that the functional 
boundary will 
jeopardize 
coordination with 
its other projects 
and interests. 
Coping strategy The principal 
temporarily takes 
back coordination 
role so as to give 
the contractor room 
for adjustment to 
new roles.  
The project 
organization engages 
in intensive 
information and 
support building 
activities towards the 
city council in order 
to safeguard the 
project. 
One actor 
temporarily takes 
the lead in the 
Agency. 
Performance 
measures are 
agreed upon in 
order to give 
direction to the 
activities of the 
Agency and to be 
able to document 
its success. 
 
The A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein corridor 
 
The extension of port of Rotterdam with the Second Maasvlakte requires additional 
traffic capacity on the A15 highway corridor between the Maasvlakte and the 
Vaanplein highway junction. 
 
The intervention: boundary decisions 
 
Therefore, in December 2010, Rijkswaterstaat, which is the executive agency of the 
Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment responsible for managing the 
main highway network, closed a PPP contract with the contractor A-Lanes A15 for the 
expansion and reconstruction of the 37 kilometer highway connection between the 
Maasvlakte and highway junction Vaanplein (territorial boundary). The PPP 
contract constitutes the structural boundaries of the institutional intervention: A-
Lanes A15 is responsible for the design, build and maintenance, and partly for the 
finance, of the project. The purpose of the project is to enhance traffic flow and safety 
on the corridor. Construction started in April 2011 and should be finished in 
December 2015. The project includes (functional boundary) the construction of 
additional traffic lanes, a dynamic traffic management system, the renovation and the 
construction of civil structures (including the design and construction of a large new 
vertical lift bridge), and the maintenance of the infrastructure system up to 2035. The 
total project volume is approx. € 2 billion, the largest ever tendered by 
Rijkswaterstaat. Leading up to the contract closure, Rijkswaterstaat closed an 
administrative agreement with 14 (semi-)public stakeholders and adherent 
implementation agreements (participation boundaries). The rationale behind these 
agreements was to get consensus between the actors beforehand so as to smoothen 
implementation in the next phase. 
 
Boundary issues 
 
Rijkswaterstaat included the implementation agreements with its local stakeholders 
in its PPP contract with A-Lanes A15. The responsibility for stakeholder management 
was transferred from Rijkswaterstaat to A-Lanes A15 a few months before the 
construction started. The rationale behind this and the contract in general can be 
summarized by the term “the market unless”, which is a strategic vision that 
Rijkswaterstaat embraced from 2003 onwards (Metze, 2010). Whereas 
Rijkswaterstaat expected to be relieved of the tasks and responsibilities of 
stakeholder management, A-Lanes A15 expected the management of stakeholder 
relations to be more or less a done deal because an administrative agreement was 
achieved between Rijkswaterstaat and local stakeholders beforehand. Initially, thus, 
these redrawn participation and structural boundaries simplified matters. 
However, a boundary issue emerged quickly. First, respondents of both 
Rijkswaterstaat and A-Lanes A15 told of multiple cases in which A-Lanes A15 was in 
conflict with stakeholders over certain geographical areas or civil structure and road 
designs in the project. The PPP contract encouraged the contractor to meet deadlines 
since exceeding those results in missing out on periodic payments by Rijkswaterstaat, 
which are crucially important for A-Lanes A15. Getting approval with local 
stakeholders – as A-Lanes A15 is contractually required to do – to implement the 
designs is then sometimes forgotten or rushed. This, in turn, led to conflicts between 
A-Lanes A15 and the local stakeholders. For instance, A-Lanes A15 constructed a 
temporary road for transporting hazardous substances without coordinating the 
design of the road with the Port of Rotterdam Authority; consequently, the Port of 
Rotterdam Authority disapproved of the road which could thus not be used by A-
Lanes A15. Second (and consequently), this also created frictions between 
Rijkswaterstaat and its stakeholders. According to Rijkswaterstaat respondents, these 
stakeholders argued that they do not have a contractual relationship with A-Lanes 
A15, but with Rijkswaterstaat instead. Hence, stakeholders such as the Port of 
Rotterdam Authority called Rijkswaterstaat to account, and at some point even 
refused to consider designs made by A-Lanes A15 that they had to approve of. They 
had lost confidence in the contractor. 
 
Coping strategies 
 
The actions of the contractor resulted in friction between the contractor and public 
stakeholders, and between Rijkswaterstaat and those same stakeholders. 
Interestingly, contra its “the market unless” vision, Rijkswaterstaat (temporarily) 
stepped forward to manage the relationships between A-Lanes A15 and the 
stakeholders. More specifically, in an attempt to restore the relationship between A-
Lanes A15 and local stakeholders, it started to verify the designs and plans of A-Lanes 
A15 before they would be sent to the stakeholders. The underlying rationale was that 
this would enhance the “role maturity” of A-Lanes A15 in the long run, i.e. that 
Rijkswaterstaat could then take a step back again and leave the infrastructure system 
to A-Lanes A15’s responsibility. The interview data strongly suggest that the coping 
strategy by Rijkswaterstaat is starting to pay off (although rebuilding confidence is a 
slow process); interviews with A-Lanes A15 demonstrate that its managers are 
increasingly aware of the importance of taking the time to coordinate designs and 
plans with stakeholders. 
 
The redevelopment of the Hearth of South 
 
The Rotterdam south bank city districts (approx. 200,000 inhabitants) have the 
largest social-economic problems in the city. These include low educational levels, 
high unemployment and crime rates and a high concentration of migrants and social 
problems. 
 
The intervention: boundary decisions 
 
In order to redevelop and revitalize the center area of the south bank thereby 
contributing to the socioeconomic recovery of the surrounding areas (territorial 
boundary), in February 2010 the Municipality of Rotterdam ordered the responsible 
project organization of the municipal Project Management Bureau to prepare a PPP 
for the development of the Heart of South project. An analysis identified the 
disconnectedness of various parts of the area as a problem (Projectbureau Heart of 
South, 2011). The large numbers of people using the local public transport hub in the 
area do not actually access the area to use its available facilities. The project is aimed 
at connecting and upgrading the various facilities in the area, in order to create “a 
mature center of Rotterdam-South” (Projectbureau Heart of South, 2011: 3). The 
project combines the physical interventions with the “social heart” program 
(functional boundary) in an integral, area-oriented program. The decision for a PPP 
is based on the judgment that only in this way the integral nature of the project can 
be sustained in times of budget constraints. This decision implied that the project 
would be developed by a project organization that strives for a successful realization 
of the project. It needed to do so by preparing a competitive dialogue tendering 
process, during which three private consortia would develop PPP master plans 
(participation boundary). As a result, as with the A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein project, 
a new division of roles in area development was foreseen: the financing and designing 
of the project, and the coordination with local stakeholders, is no longer a 
responsibility of the Municipality but of the prospective private consortium. 
Furthermore, the city council is expected to agree with a generic project plan after 
which the project is placed at arm’s length (structural boundary). 
 
Boundary issues 
 
In March 2010 the Municipality published its intention to start the tendering process. 
After a market consultation the tender document was prepared. In January 2011 a 
cost-benefit analysis was completed and the investment proposal was finalized. 
Public decision making could commence. Because the tendering had to start one year 
after the intention announcement, the executive board of the Municipality and the 
city council were asked to ratify the investment proposal by February 1st. Although 
these bodies were sympathetic to the plan, they first wanted to decide on the long-
term investment plan for the whole municipality. When decision making finally was 
due in August 2011, the city council disagreed to take the investment decision based 
on generic information. The city council challenged the previous made structural and 
functional boundary decisions. Regarding the structural boundaries, being put at 
distance of the project, the city council had difficulty accepting its role and 
consequently requested detailed information and adjustments of the original 
structural boundary decisions. Regarding the functional boundaries, the political 
decision makers drew the boundaries of the decision making quite differently than 
the project organization: the issue was not whether or how a PPP should be realized; 
the project was weighted against other projects. The precarious budgetary situation 
required the Municipality to set priorities among the various projects up for decision 
making, of which the Heart of South is just one. In this debate, the issue was not 
whether the PPP should be realized, but whether the project and its integral format 
would be selected in the first place. 
 
Coping strategies 
 
Unexpectedly, the project manager had to compete with other projects, convincing 
the decision makers of the added value of the project. In this struggle for survival he 
could not mobilize support from local stakeholders because the boundary decision to 
develop the project content in the next phase with the private developers implied that 
stakeholders had not been included. Their participation was foreseen after the project 
content would be defined. Eventually, the Heart of South project survived the 
political decision making, partly due to the positive cost-benefit analysis that other 
projects lacked. Only after considerable persuasive efforts, which include various 
sessions and the concession that it would be involved in future decision rounds, the 
city council was prepared to accept the conditions and idea of the tendering. In 
September 2011 the searching for private partners could start. These coping strategies 
succeeded due to the competences of the project leader, due to his direct access to his 
political superior who backed the project in this difficult phase, and due to sheer luck: 
the competitive advantage of the availability of a positive cost-benefit analysis. 
 
The Traffic Management Agency in the Rotterdam region 
 
Rotterdam is Europe’s largest logistic and industrial hub (Port of Rotterdam 
Authority, 2011). In 2007, the national government decided to invest in enlarging the 
container handling capacity of the port area. This 1000 acres enlargement, named the 
Second Maasvlakte, is achieved by land reclamation from the North Sea. The 
expansion will lead to an increased growth of the number of containers which have to 
be transported to the hinterland. However, handling capacity of the port is restricted 
by the transport capacity of the available infrastructure system (Geerlings et al., 
2009). Although most containers are transported by road (which is an important 
reason for the A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein project), the ongoing expansion of the road 
capacity with additional traffic lanes is not considered a sustainable solution in the 
long run. One should also think of other solutions. 
 
The intervention: boundary decisions 
 
To this purpose, under the political pressure of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment and in close cooperation with the Port of Rotterdam Authority, the 
Traffic Management Agency was created in 2008. The somber forecast for the 
accessibility on the medium term future led to a shared sense-of-urgency that actions 
were needed to guarantee the accessibility of the road network and that the present 
decision making between the stakeholders with their own jurisdictions was too 
fragmented, too inert and too complex to address the challenge. The aim of the 
institutional intervention was to deal with the traffic management capacity challenge 
(functional boundary) in the Rotterdam region (territorial boundary). The Traffic 
Management Agency consists of four organizations: Rijkswaterstaat, the Municipality 
of Rotterdam, the Rotterdam Metropolitan Region, and the Port of Rotterdam 
Authority (participation boundary). All actors have a common interest regarding the 
accessibility of the port by road, but Rijkswaterstaat is responsible for managing the 
main highway network, the Port of Rotterdam Authority for the roads in the port 
area, and the regional authorities for the regional infrastructure (structural 
boundaries). With the creation of the Traffic Management Agency these 
responsibilities are rearranged. The aim is to tackle the traffic issue via horizontal 
alignment to realize a more efficient coordination of actions. The activities and 
instruments of the Agency are very diverse, varying from PR-activities to financial 
incentives aimed at behavioral change. The Agency operates through a uniform 
program with several projects to improve the accessibility on and around the A15. 
 
Boundary issues 
 
Initially, tackling the traffic capacity challenge was hampered by functional and 
structural boundaries judgments which could be coined “turf conflicts”. The actors 
had different ideas about the solutions; especially the Port of Rotterdam Authority 
was very critical. On the one hand, it was dissatisfied with the existing situation as 
they could not influence the policies on and around the A15 corridor. The Traffic 
Management Agency would allow the Authority to have influence on policies that did 
not belong to its jurisdiction before. On the other hand, the Agency was a difficult 
experiment because it required the Port of Rotterdam Authority to share 
responsibilities with other actors, especially Rijkswaterstaat (both are traditionally 
monopolists on their territory). In short, initially some frictions between these actors 
occurred. 
 
Coping strategies 
 
To cope with the boundary issues, Rijkswaterstaat was pushed by its Ministry to 
cooperate as they were rather unwilling to share power. Therefore the first director of 
the Traffic Management Agency was recruited from Rijkswaterstaat; the Port of 
Rotterdam Authority is more single-issue driven and therefore less equipped to the 
task of coordinating the cooperation. At first, there were no indicators to measure the 
success of the Traffic Management Agency institutional intervention, which made its 
participants unconfident about the efficiency and effectiveness of the arrangement. 
After the startup problems, the institutional intervention did lead to increased 
interaction and trust between its participants. “Working by doing” became the 
leading paradigm. The functional and structural boundary issues were coped with by 
operationalizing the intention to cooperate, i.e. by setting concrete indicators for 
success. 
It may be too early to say if the coping strategy led to better results but, based on 
evaluation reports and interviews with stakeholders, the opinion seems justified that 
the institutional intervention is a success. Originally, the existing boundary 
judgments hampered efficient and integral policy making. However, since the 
summer of 2011 there were six places in Rotterdam that were placed under de 
jurisdiction of the Traffic Management Agency, and from March 2012 onwards the 
Agency is also responsible for the “Better Utilization Program” in the Rotterdam 
region. This indicates the success of the Agency, and its model will be transplanted to 
other regions in the Netherlands as well. It is striking, though, that whilst 
transportation is a derived effect from e.g. logistic demand, the business community 
does not participate in the intervention. A better understanding of the motivation of 
companies could be a potential coping strategy. It may be argued that this is an 
overlooked and potentially relevant partner to participate in the intervention, but as 
of yet it is too early to say what kind of boundary issues the absence of the business 
community may produce. 
 
The taming of complexity: three institutional interventions compared 
 
We started with an interest in how institutional interventions deal with the 
complexity of urban planning projects. To that purpose we formulated the following 
research question: what boundary decisions do institutional interventions imply, 
what are the underlying boundary judgments, which boundary issues arise, and how 
are these issues coped with? In this section we answer the research question and give 
some final reflections on our findings. 
 
Boundary decisions and issues in institutional interventions 
 
The cases show that various boundary judgments underlie the boundary decisions of 
institutional interventions. Each of the interventions involves the redrawing of 
functional, territorial, participatory and structural system boundaries in order to 
align the arrangement with the existing institutional landscape so as to enable action 
in complex urban systems such as Rotterdam. It is assumed that by internalizing 
complexity in a new arrangement, the adherent new internal coordination 
mechanisms will increase control over the urban problems that the projects intend to 
solve. Our cases show, however, that the redrawn boundaries go hand in hand with 
the rise of new boundary issues that need to be coped with. 
Our cases show that judgments underlying the boundary decisions are not 
necessarily shared or understood by the actors that participate in the institutional 
intervention. Although Rijkswaterstaat and the Port of Rotterdam Authority 
concluded an implementation agreement regarding the construction of the A15 
corridor, their structural boundary judgments diverged. The case of the Traffic 
Management Agency shows that even though its participants had explicitly agreed 
upon the boundary decisions, in practice they had a hard time to let go traditional 
divides and ways of doing. Despite a shared urgency to horizontally cooperate, 
Rijkswaterstaat did not judge its partners in the Traffic Management Agency to be 
able to act truly cooperatively, given their interests and responsibilities. In the case of 
the Heart of South, politicians and administrators commissioned the project 
organization to prepare a PPP at arm’s length without fully realizing the consequent 
implications for their own involvement. 
Moreover, the boundary decisions underlying the institutional interventions 
highlighted specific interdependencies between the actors, but neglected or 
externalized others. This makes for often unexpected boundary issues. While 
arranging its respective relationships with the contractor and the Port of Rotterdam 
Authority in the A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein project through the PPP, Rijkswaterstaat 
insufficiently coordinated the relationship between the contractor and the Port of 
Rotterdam Authority. The project organization of the Heart of South focused on 
preparing a PPP and a tender process in the form of competitive dialogue. These 
decisions implied that the local stakeholders were not involved in the preparation 
phase and that the city council had to agree to be placed at distance during the rest of 
the project. Consequently, stakeholders could not be mobilized to defend the project 
when its survival was at stake during the political decision making. Also it was not 
self-evident that the city council would agree with giving up decision making power 
as planned. The Traffic Management Agency aimed at coordinating the interactions 
of its participants, leaving the relationship with the business community unattended. 
 
Coping strategies 
 
The cases show various strategies that actors used to cope with the boundary issues 
that often unexpectedly arose. In the case of A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein project, 
Rijkswaterstaat coped by reverting to its initial role as manager of the relationships 
with local stakeholders. In other words, its structural boundary judgments were 
somewhat redrawn again towards the situation prior to the PPP contract. 
Rijkswaterstaat expects that this is only a temporary setback, and that contractor and 
local stakeholders will gradually readjust to their new roles. In the case of the Heart 
of South, the project organization coped by engaging in management efforts aimed at 
convincing political decision makers of the added value of the project. It succeeded, 
partly because the positive cost-benefit analysis that was developed in preparation of 
the tender process provided the project with an advantage relative to competing 
projects that lacked such a cost-benefit analysis. In the case of the Traffic 
Management Agency, the boundary issue was temporarily solved by letting 
Rijkswaterstaat chair the Agency, so that the participants in the intervention could 
adapt their new roles and develop trust. Specifying success indicators contributed to 
this process, giving directions to the participants and providing an instrument to 
make their joint successes visible. 
Contemplating the cases, various coping strategies can be identified. They vary 
from efforts in convincing others to comply with the suggested boundaries, to 
engaging into interface management, to temporally redrawing the boundaries or to 
make new boundary decisions all together. Copings strategies are not necessarily 
successful and may require yet further coping. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Institutional interventions may simplify complexity in urban planning projects by 
drawing boundaries, but by the same token they also neglect matters, making for the 
often unexpected occurrence of boundary issues. Unexpectedness is a fundamental 
aspect of urban planning projects (cf. McDaniel & Driebe, 2005; Söderholm, 2008). 
As far as things are certain, it can be expected that boundary issues will arise. In our 
cases, actors succeeded in overcoming these issues by applying various coping 
strategies (cf. Ashmos et al., 2000), sometimes referred to as interface management 
(e.g. Fellows & Liu, 2012), adaptive management (e.g. Edelenbos et al., 2009) or 
adaptive governance (e.g. Van Meerkerk et al., 2013). 
Our findings show that institutional interventions do not resolve complexity 
once and for all by internalizing it. Rather, interventions require investments in 
management capacity aimed at dealing with unexpected boundary issues (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007; Koppenjan et al., 2011). This means that management efforts should 
also be focused on guiding the learning process by which participants in the 
intervention gradually accept the new boundaries, capture their new roles or engage 
in coping strategies (cf. McDaniel et al., 2003). This includes increasing awareness of 
and explicit reflection on one’s and each other’s boundary judgments (cf. Ulrich, 
1987). After all, boundary judgments are social constructs, and their legitimacy and 
effectiveness may increase when these judgments are made explicit and are 
negotiated. 
 
References 
 
Ashmos, D.P., Duchon, D. and McDaniel, R.R. (2000). "Organizational responses to 
complexity: The effect on organizational performance," Journal of 
Organizational Change, ISSN 0953-4814, 13(6): 577-594.  
Edelenbos, J. and Klijn, E.H. (2006). "Managing stakeholder involvement in decision 
making: A comparative analysis of six interactive processes in the Netherlands," 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, ISSN 1477-9803, 
16(3): 417-446.  
Edelenbos, J., Klijn, E.H. and Kort, M.B. (2009). "Managing complex process 
systems: Surviving at the edge of chaos," in G.R. Teisman, M.W. van Buuren 
and L.M. Gerrits (eds.), Managing Complex Governance Systems: Dynamics, 
Self-Organization and Coevolution in Public Investments, ISBN 
9780415459730, pp. 172-192.  
Edelenbos, J., Van Buuren, M.W. and Klijn, E.H. (2013). "Connective capacities of 
network managers: A comparative study of management styles in eight regional 
governance networks," Public Management Review, ISSN 1471-9045, 15(1): 
131-159.  
Fellows, R. and Liu, A.M.M. (2012). "Managing organizational interfaces in 
engineering construction projects: Addressing fragmentation and boundary 
issues across multiple interfaces," Construction Management and Economics, 
ISSN  1466-433X, 30(8): 653-671.  
Geerlings, H., Van Meijeren, J., Vonk-Noordegraaf, D. and Soeterbroek, F. (2009). 
Transumo A15 Project van Maasvlakte naar Achterland: Duurzaam Vervoer 
als Uitdaging, Rotterdam: Consortium Transumo A15 Project. 
Grimsey, D. and Lewis, M.K. (2004). Public Private Partnerships: The Worldwide 
Revolution in Infrastructure Provision and Project Finance, ISBN 
9781847202260.  
Koppenjan, J.F.M., Veeneman, W., Van der Voort, H., Ten Heuvelhof, E.F. and 
Leijten, M. (2011). "Competing management approaches in large engineering 
projects: The Dutch RandstadRail project," International Journal of Project 
Management, ISSN 0263-7863, 29(6): 740-750. 
McDaniel, R.R. and Driebe, D.J. (eds.). (2005). Uncertainty and Surprise in 
Complex Systems: Questions on Working With the Unexpected, ISBN 
9783540237730.  
McDaniel, R.R., Jordan, M.E. and Fleeman, B.F. (2003). "Surprise, surprise, 
surprise! A complexity science view of the unexpected," Health Care 
Management Review, ISSN 1550-5030, 28(3): 266-278.  
Metze, M. (2010). Veranderend Getij: Rijkswaterstaat in Crisis, ISBN 
9789050189712.  
Pel, B. (2009). "The complexity of self-organization: Boundary judgments in traffic 
management," in G.R. Teisman, M.W. van Buuren and L.M. Gerrits (eds.), 
Managing Complex Governance Systems: Dynamics, Self-Organization and 
Coevolution in Public Investments, ISBN 9780415459730, pp. 116-133.  
Port of Rotterdam Authority. (2011). Havenvisie 2030: Port Compass, Rotterdam: 
Port of Rotterdam Authority.  
Projectbureau Heart of South. (2011). Ambitiedocument, Rotterdam: Municipality of 
Rotterdam.  
Rescher, N. (1998). Complexity: A philosophical Overview, ISBN 1560003774.  
Söderholm, A. (2008). "Project management of unexpected events," International 
Journal of Project Management, ISSN 0263-7863, 26(1): 80-86.  
Steenhuisen, B. (2009). Competing Public Values: Coping Strategies in Heavily 
Regulated Utility Industries, ISBN 9789490122553. 
Teisman, G.R. and Edelenbos, J. (2011). "Towards a perspective of system 
synchronization in water governance: A synthesis of empirical lessons and 
complexity theories," International Review of Administrative Sciences, ISSN 
1471-9045, 77(1): 101-118.  
Teisman, G.R., Van Buuren, M.W. and Gerrits, L.M. (eds.). (2009). Managing 
Complex Governance Systems: Dynamics, Self-Organization and Coevolution 
in Public Investments, ISBN 9780415459730.  
Ulrich, W. (1987). "Critical heuristics of social systems design," European Journal of 
Operational Research, ISSN 0377-2217, 31(3): 276-283.  
Van Gils, M.K.A., Gerrits, L.M. and Teisman, G.R. (2009). "Non-linear dynamics in 
port systems: Change events at work," in G.R. Teisman, M.W. van Buuren and 
L.M. Gerrits (eds.), Managing Complex Governance Systems: Dynamics, Self-
organization and Coevolution in Public Investments, ISBN 9780415459730, 
pp. 76-96.  
Van Meerkerk, I.F., Van Buuren, M.W. and Edelenbos, J. (2013). "Water managers' 
boundary judgments and adaptive water governance: An analysis of the Dutch 
Haringvliet sluices case," Water Resources Management, ISSN 0920-4741, 
27(7): 2179-2194.  
Verweij, S. (2012). "Management as system synchronization: The case of the Dutch 
A2 Passageway Maastricht project," Emergence: Complexity & Organization, 
ISSN 1521-7000, 14(4): 17-37.  
Weick, K.E. and Sutcliffe, K.M. (2007). Managing the Unexpected: Resilient 
Performance in an Age of Uncertainty, ISBN 9780787996499.  
Yan, A. and Louis, M.R. (1999). The migration of organizational functions to the work 
unit level: Buffering, spanning, and bringing up boundaries," Human Relations, 
ISSN 1741-282X, 52(1): 25-47.  
Yin, R.K. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, ISBN 9781412960991. 
 
About the authors 
 
Stefan Verweij is a PhD student at the Department of Public Administration at 
Erasmus University Rotterdam. He is involved in the research group Governance of 
Complex Systems (GOCS). His current research focusses on the management of 
infrastructure projects and on Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). He has 
published in Emergence: Complexity & Organization, Evaluation, Public 
Administration and Journal of Critical Realism.  
 
Ingmar F. van Meerkerk is a PhD student at the Department of Public Administration 
at Erasmus University Rotterdam. He is involved in the research group Governance 
of Complex Systems (GOCS). His current research focusses on the role of boundary 
spanners related to legitimacy and performance in interactive governance settings. 
He has published in Policy Sciences, European Planning Studies, Local Government 
Studies and Water Resources Management. 
 
Joop F.M. Koppenjan is a professor at the Department of Public Administration at 
Erasmus University Rotterdam. He focuses on comparative research into network 
governance, public-private partnerships and public policy delivery in infrastructure-
related sectors, such as transport, energy and water, and non-infrastructure-related 
sectors such as care, healthcare, education and public safety. 
 
Harry Geerlings is professor of Governance and Sustainable Mobility at the 
Department of Public Administration at Erasmus University Rotterdam. He is a 
member of Erasmus Smart Port Rotterdam, a new initiative between the Port 
community and the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Most of his research is related to 
the interaction between transport, environment and spatial planning. 
